Whereas the norm in studies of action-reaction models is to study continuous independent and dependent variables, I employ a binary dependent variable because accurate conflict tolerance thresholds might not be discernable with a continuous dependent variable. Conclusions derived from traditional models can be misleading when behavior thresholds are calculated from estimates of A's responsiveness to B across the spectrum of B's behavior, including high degrees of conflict. These high values of received conflict may contribute little useful data for determining threshold effects (differences in extreme values may have only a small marginal effect on the probability that the recipient will respond with conflict) yet they can bias judgments about whether A will cooperate or conflict when the intensity of B's conflict is low. (Also, judgments will be biased if A adjusts its proportional responses from target-to-target or crisis-tocrisis more than it varies its basic decision to cooperate or to conflict.) Given these problems, modeling effects on a binary dependent variable offers clear advantages.
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Second, tests established that the findings changed when the dependent variable was recoded: actors absorb conflict more readily when absorption is defined to include neutral behavior. This is especially true of the US when it had not previously cooperated with a target.
With the revised transition point, when HL R = 0 and NB S(t-1) =0, the US absorbed a high of 100 units of LL conflict in the Nixon-Ford years and a low of 21 units in the Truman years. Indeed, in the HL range of ± 100, the US absorbed some level of LL conflict with or without prior cooperation, almost without exception. (The differences between the sets of thresholds generated with different definitions of absorption are statistically significant; on this, see below.)
Conversely, moving the transition point does not change the time periods in which, or the conditions under which (NB S(t-1) =0 or 1), the Soviet Union accommodated LL conflict. See Supplemental Table II and III. Third, tests were performed to determine whether apparent US and Soviet accommodation rests in a mis-specified lag structure: that is, whether behavior attributed to a reaction to target behavior is actually a response by the US or Soviet Union to their own behavior in prior quarters. Likelihood ratio tests were thus performed on each model to determine the appropriate lag structure for NB S(t-n) in each period and, based on these tests, multiple lag models were estimated. A series of thresholds were then derived (with HL R set to 0) by progressively setting the value of the lag terms to 1 (starting with the first-quarter lag and moving to nthquarter lag). The results show that single-lag models overstate the US and Soviet tendency to absorb conflict compared to models that assume explicitly that the actor conflicted with a target, two, three, or more quarters ago. When the first several lag terms are set to 1, though, the US (but not the Soviet Union) is often shown to have accommodated considerably greater amounts of conflict than was revealed in prior tests, and even greater amounts of conflict when more 5 remote lags are set to 1. These findings are made more noteworthy by the typically longer lag length of the US models which mitigates against higher US absorption levels in any US-Soviet comparison (distant lags that are present only in the US model are assumed to obtain a 0 value).
See Supplemental Table IV-VI. Fourth, tests for simultaneity between LL R and NB S were performed using the two-stage probit least squares (2SPLS) and two-stage conditional maximum likelihood (2SCML) methods described in Alvarez and Glasgow (2000) . In these tests, a reciprocal relationship was assumed to exist between NB S (the binary dependent variable) and LL R , and each of these variables was assumed to be a function of its respective value in each of the prior four quarters (lags1-lag4).
(To calculate thresholds from the derived parameters in the 2SCML model, the value of the residual variable in the model was set to 0.) The 2SCML results suggest that simultaneity is present in the US analysis in the first three periods but not in the last three; and both methods have the effect of reducing the apparent US ability to absorb LL conflict in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy years. Conversely, accounting for simultaneity increases somewhat the apparent US ability to absorb LL conflict in the Johnson, Nixon-Ford, and Carter years.
Applied to the Soviet model, the 2SCML method implicates simultaneity in the results for all but the last period; moreover, both tests indicate that the uncorrected probit analysis overstates the Soviet ability to absorb LL conflict in the Kennedy and Johnson years. In turn, 2SPLS tests performed to correct for possible simultaneity between HL R and NB S in both the US and Soviet models do not alter the basic patterns observed in Tables I and II (in the main text) . Taken together, then, these tests reinforce the argument that the US and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union absorbed conflict. See Supplemental Table VII-XI. Fifth, tests using a continuous dependent variable point again to a strong US tendency and 6 weaker Soviet tendency to accommodate conflict. To obtain these results, OLS regression was performed on the models in each of the six periods using continuous dependent and lagged endogenous variables; then, threshold values were calculated by 'neutralizing' the effect of the lagged variable (setting it to zero) to impose a harsh test that nonetheless permits comparison with the findings in Tables I and II ( confidence levels for a probabilistic distribution of threshold values, Monte Carlo exercises were performed by randomly drawing each parameter a thousand times from a normal distribution of values (with means equal to the given parameter value, the standard deviation equal to the standard error of a parameter, and the correlation structure among the parameters defined by the covariance matrix), and then multiplying each of these thousand sets of parameters by the given values of HL (50, 0, or -50) and NB S(t-1) (0 or1). (The simulations were performed using corr2data in STATA 7.0.) The confidence interval was thus defined by the model threshold values that delimited the top 2.5 % and bottom 2.5% of the 1000 threshold estimates for each set of HL and NB S(t-1) and Soviet capacity to absorb conflict. In all these simulations, the mean absorption thresholds fall below the calculated threshold value and show the US and Soviet Union to have absorbed at least some LL conflict in every period, whatever the HL and NB S(t-1) value. The probabilistic thresholds support the prior findings, then, in specific respects. First, the periods in which these actors were most and least accommodative follow the patterns in Tables I and II In contrast, the single threshold value calculated for NB R (equation 6) closely tracks the threshold calculated for an HL R value of zero (equation 3): then, the point at which the US starts accommodating Soviet conflict is no more than two quarters removed from those in Figure 1 and, as before, the Soviet Union does not accommodate US conflict.
Supplemental Figure 2 displays the results when the dyadic analysis is extended into the last years of the Cold War, using WEIS data for the 1966-91 period. While the WEIS data do not show the US to have been as forgiving of Soviet conflict as the COPDAB data do, the WEIS data again indicate a greater US than Soviet willingness to absorb conflict (a smaller, -15 to +15, range in HL R behavior is used in the analysis of the weighted WEIS data because of the limited range over which the latter vary). With prior cooperation (2c), the US consistently absorbed at least some level of Soviet conflict throughout the 1966-91 period: with a +15 value of HL R behavior, the US always absorbed conflict in excess of cooperation received; with neutral HL R behavior, the US absorbed conflict in all but a brief period in the late 1980s. Without prior cooperation (2a), however, absorption is more limited. Indeed, by the mid-1970s, the effects of renewed US-Soviet Cold War tension are evident; and, by the mid-1980s, with the hard-line policies of the Reagan administration, the US is shown quite unwilling to absorb LL R conflict even when the Soviets were generally cooperative (a +15 value of HL R behavior). Not until the final years of the Cold War does the US revert to its accommodative self. Still, the US, when least forgiving, was as willing to absorb conflict as the Soviet Union was when it was most tolerant. Without prior cooperation (2b), the Soviet Union did not absorb conflict; with prior cooperation (2d), the Soviet Union did not absorb conflict until the early 1980s.
Finally, because it is hard to rely on hypothetical thresholds derived from a mathematical model without some sense of whether these thresholds provide a more valid measure of the willingness of these actors to accommodate conflict than the zero point in the net behavior they receive, visual tests were performed on the calculated threshold values to see whether they are better predictors of actor behavior than the threshold values of the naive model. If the neutral point actually serves as a valid probabilistic threshold, accommodation will occur with greater relative frequency, on the positive side of the threshold, as the values of LL R increase as much as non-accommodation will occur with greater relative frequency, on the negative side of the 11 threshold, as the values of LL R decrease.
Supplemental Figure 3 , for the US (by target-quarter), shows a neutral value of net behavior does not satisfy these requirements. Figure 3a plots the difference between the neutral point (the line) and the actual value of overall net behavior received by the US separately for observations where US accommodation occurred (the upper line) and for observations where US non-accommodation occurred (the bottom line). What is clear from the distribution of points around these lines is that overall value of net behavior received is a biased predictor of whether the US accommodates conflict. Although the likelihood that received net behavior will be accommodated increases as the value of net behavior stands further above the neutral point (compare the density of points above the top line with that above the bottom line), the probability that received net behavior will not be accommodated does not increase as the value of net behavior drops further below the line (compare the density of points below the top line with that below the bottom line).
Contrast these results with those in Figure 3b when 0 (the line) represents the moving threshold value derived from the probit coefficients (remember that the threshold changes because an actor's capacity to absorb conflict changes with the value of the model variables). Now, the chances of the US accommodating (LL R ) behavior increase as the value of that behavior rises above the line (becoming more cooperative) and decrease as the value of received behavior drops further below the line (becoming less cooperative). (The intense clustering of points above both the top and bottom line might obscure this point. However, within 50, 100, and 150 units above the line, the probability of accommodation occurring is 64, 79, and 88 percent, respectively.) True, non-accommodation occurs more frequently above than below the probit threshold (b) and more frequently above the probit threshold than above the naive model threshold (a); but this does not impugn the value of the probit predictor. There is no reason to suppose the US receives as much behavior below as above its threshold value. (Although the two sets of figures do not portray the "fit" of the two thresholds with the same set of data points --the naive model threshold predicts accommodation from the received value of overall net behavior, the probit threshold predicts accommodation from the received value of low-level net behavior --the improved fit is not due to switching measures.)
How do these results compare with those specific to the US-Soviet Union dyads (obtained from the moving time-series analysis)? Supplemental Figure 4 displays the naive model results for the US capacity to accommodate Soviet net behavior (4a) and Soviet capacity to accommodate US net behavior (4b); for comparison, it presents the probit results for the US capacity to accommodate Soviet LL net behavior (4c) and Soviet capacity to accommodate US LL net behavior (4d). In the figure, the naive model appears especially inadequate for predicting US accommodation throughout the 1960s, a period in which the US consistently accommodated Soviet conflict (note the cluster of pluses under the top line in 4a in this period). Resetting the threshold (4c), using a probit model, "lowers" the threshold value in the 1960s (there are more pluses above the top line than below it) while not increasing the chances that nonaccommodation will occur above the bottom line. ("Lowering" the threshold value, here, is equivalent to what is commonly meant by "raising" the conflict threshold: a positive value, in this analysis, indicates cooperation.) In the parlance of medical testing, the threshold is made more "sensitive" (it now picks up more pluses above the threshold, reducing the false negative problem), although it is no less "specific" (the false positive problem). (Again, the change in result is not explained by the fact that 3a predicts the US accommodation of net behavior while 3c predicts the US accommodation of LL behavior.) 
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